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Abstract
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments when strategic voters
hold private information about which propositions are true and share a common
preference for true collective judgments. We go beyond previous work by introducing
logical interconnections between the propositions. A voter’s private information can
be inconclusive. The goal is to determine the voting rules which lead to collective
judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the
(rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
1 Introduction
The theory of judgment aggregation deals with situations where a group needs to make
a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on several issues on the basis of group members’
judgments on these issues. Many decision making problems in real life involve multiple
issues. The jury in a court trial might need to form judgments on whether the
defendant has broken the contract, and whether the contract is legally valid. The
city council might need to reach judgments on whether the CO2 level in the city is
above the critical threshold and whether the chemical plant in the city should be
closed down. In such problems, the issues on the group’s agenda might be mutually
interconnected, in that the judgment made on one issue might constrain the judgment
on another issue. In the city commission example, the CO2 level being judged to be
above the critical threshold might restrict the judgment on the second issue to ‘yes’;
i.e., lead to the closing of the chemical factory. Judgment aggregation models allow
for the study of a wide range of realistic collective decision making problems.
When it comes to aggregate judgments in decision making bodies like juries or
city councils, it seems natural to have epistemic concerns. Such problems are different
than problems where individuals have conflicting aims. In the court trial example,
the jury’s problem is to find out two independent facts, whether the defendant has
broken the contract and whether the contract is legally valid. It seems that the
primary goal is reaching the truth in such problems. The epistemic approach in
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judgment aggregation aims to reach true group judgments. According to the classical
social-choice theoretic approach in judgment aggregation – where voters are taken to
have conflicting aims – a good voting rule should be fair to jurors while according to
the epistemic approach, a good voting rule should track the truth. Whether a voting
rule is good in tracking the truth or not depends on questions such as whether the
individuals’ judgments are sufficient evidence for the truth value of each issue, and
whether individuals have expressed their judgments truthfully.
This chapter assumes that the group faces two issues, and a ‘no’ answer to both
issues is inconsistent. Consistency is a property that requires the collective decision to
be free from any logical contradictions. In the city council example, the inconsistency
arises in case of a ‘yes’ judgment on the first issue (CO2 level is above the threshold)
and a ‘no’ judgment on the second issue (the chemical plant should not be closed
down). We assume that voters share the common goal of tracking the truth but each
has private information regarding the truth value of each issue. In this setting we want
to answer the following question: Which voting rules lead to efficient and truthful
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game? So, we want to design voting
rules which first lead to truthful revelation of private information, and second lead to
the efficiency in equilibrium. Note that individual reporting of private information
need not always be truthful, even when voters have no conflicting aims. As Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) show, if a voter conditions her beliefs on being pivotal –
on being able to change the outcome – she may not always find it best to report
truthfully. The question of consistency here arises when one wants to use quota rules
(where separate votes are taken on each proposition using acceptance thresholds)
which are practical and common. This paper also examines the possibility of truth-
tracking in particular with quota rules.
The epistemic perspective with strategic concerns is well-established in a different
body of the literature, which studies single issue problems (Austen-Smith and Banks
1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, 1998). There have been few works taking
the epistemic approach in judgment aggregation. The work by Bozbay, Dietrich
and Peters (2011) studies judgment aggregation from the epistemic and strategic
voting perspective. They model voters’ common interests and private information,
with an agenda with independent issues and they study the problem of designing a
voting rule. We extend their work to agendas where issues are interconnected. Ahn
and Oliveros (2011) and De Clippel and Eliaz (2011) study elections on multiple
issues with common preferences and asymmetric information. Each of these papers
compares two voting rules in terms of whether they efficiently aggregate information,
asymptotically as the group size tends to infinity.
A series of possibility and impossibility results from the perspective of classical
social-choice theoretic approach are successfully obtained in the judgment aggrega-
tion literature (e.g., List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006, 2007, 2010, Nehring and
Puppe 2008, 2010, Dietrich and List 2007a, 2007c, 2008, Dokow and Holzman 2010a,
2010b, Dietrich and Mongin 2010; see also precursor results by Guilbaud 1952 and
Wilson 1975; for an introductory overview see List and Polak 2010). Ahn and Oliveros
(2012) study voting games where voters hold private values of, but common inform-
ation about issues. Few papers about judgment aggregation take a truth-tracking
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perspective without considering private information and strategic incentives (e.g.,
Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006 and List 2005). Dietrich and List (2007b) analyse stra-
tegic voting behaviour resulting from private values instead of private information.
See also related work by Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2007). List and Pettit (2011)
provide a systematic philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking approach.
This paper also relates to the body of work on binary choice problems where stra-
tegic voters with common interests and private information are considered. Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) show that it typically
cannot be rational for all voters to vote sincerely, and that the choice of voting rule
matters considerably for sincere voting and efficient information aggregation. Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) add an extra dimension of pre-voting deliberation.
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) extend the approach to continuous rather than binary
private information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi
(2000) examine the (in)effectiveness of unanimity rule in ‘protecting the innocent’ in
jury trials.
The paper proceeds as follows. Two questions are answered in Section 2 and
Section 3; respectively, when informative voting is efficient, and when informative
voting is efficient by quota rules in particular. By informative voting, we generally
mean ‘following the evidence’ whenever the evidence is consistent with the true state.1
Section 2.1 presents the model, in which a group of voters is to decide whether to
accept or reject each of two propositions while they can not reject both at the same
time. The model presented in Section 3.1 differs from the model in Section 2.1 in
that the collective decision might be inconsistent; hence, both propositions can be
collectively rejected. In both models, voters hold truth-tracking preferences and they
vote on the basis of private information which may possibly be inconsistent. Section
2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 address the key question of how to design the voting rule such that
it leads to efficient decisions as well as simple-minded, truthful voting behaviour in
equilibrium. The answer depends on both the kind of utility function in use and the
definition of simple-minded behaviour. It turns out that in many situations such a
voting rule doesn’t exist. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
such rules are also given and these rules are characterized by some properties. Section
3.2 addresses the possibility of efficient information aggregation with quota rules and
provides an impossibility result. All proofs are in appendix.
2 Efficient information aggregation
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 A simple judgment aggregation problem
We consider a group of voters, labeled i = 1, ..., n, where n ≥ 2. There are two
propositions p and q, and their negations p¯ and q¯. The group of voters wants to obtain
a collective judgment on whether p or p¯ is true, and whether q or q¯ is true. While
1An informative voter reveals her private information in her vote whenever the private information
is non-conflicting with the true state. Two kinds of informative behaviour is analysed in this work.
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doing so, voters know that the combination {p¯, q¯} is not possible. The three possible
judgment sets are {p, q}, {p, q¯}, {p¯, q}, abbreviated by pq, pq¯ and p¯q, respectively2.
Each voter votes for a judgment set in J = {pq, pq¯, p¯q}. A collective decision is taken
using a voting rule. A voting rule is defined as a function f : J n → J , which maps
each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision d ≡ f(v). Some salient properties of
voting rules are defined below:
• Anonymity: For all voting profiles (v1, ..., vn) ∈ J n and all permutations (i1, ...,
in) of the voters, f(vi1 , ..., vin) = f(v1, ..., vn). Informally, the voters are treated
equally.
• Monotonicity: For all voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n, if for each r in f(v) the voters
who accept r in v also accept r in v′, then f(v′) = f(v). Informally, additional
support for the collectively accepted propositions never reverses the collective
acceptance of these propositions.
• Independence: The decision on each proposition r ∈ {p, q} only depends on the
votes on r. Informally, the group in effect takes two separate votes, one between
p and p¯ and one between q and q¯.
To define the next property, we introduce some notation. Given a voting profile
v = (v1, ..., vn), for each r ∈ {p, q} let vr := (v1r, ..., vnr) be the vector with entities
defined as follows: for i = 1, ..., n, vir = 1 if vi contains r and vir = 0 if vi contains r¯.
• Neutrality: For every voting profile v and every voting profile v′ for which
there is no permutation (i1, ..., in) of the voters with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n),
if vr = v
′
r′ for each r, r
′ ∈ {p, q} with r 6= r′, then f accepts r in v if and
only if f accepts r′ in v′. Informally, if two voting profiles have the exact same
acceptance regime between different propositions, so do the decisions.
2.1.2 A common preference for true collective judgments
There is one ‘correct’ judgment set in J , which we call the state (of the world),
denoted by s. The state is unobservable by voters. Voters have identical preferences,
captured by a common utility function u : J ×J → R which maps any decision-state
pair (d, s) to its utility u(d, s). The notion of truth-tracking requires the utility to be
high if the decision is correct, but details matter. We focus on two natural kinds of
preferences:
Simple preferences. The utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d 6= s (incorrect decision). (1)
Simple preferences are the simplest candidate for truth-tracking preferences.3
2Similarly, {p¯, q¯} is abbreviated by p¯q¯.
3A voter tracks the truth on a proposition p if the following is true: if p were true, the voter would
accept p and if p were false, the agent would accept p¯ (Nozick, 1981).
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Consequentialist preferences. Here, we assume that the decision leads to one
of two possible consequences which represents group actions.4 This is captured by a
consequence function Co which maps the set of possible decisions J to a two-element
set of possible consequences. Consider a market with only one firm, Firm A. Firms
B and C are interested in entering the market and Firm B has higher capacity than
Firm C. The executive board of firm C is to make judgments on whether or not firm A
will expand its capacity (p) and firm B will enter the market (q). While doing so, the
board members know that if Firm A does not increase capacity, then Firm B will enter
the market; hence, p¯→ q. If both issues are judged to be true, then the consequence is
‘no market entry’ (Co(pq) =‘no market entry’), while if only one of the issues is judged
to be true, the consequence is ‘market entry’ (Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) =‘market entry’).5 It
turns out that this consequence function with the property Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q)
is the only interesting consequence function up to isomorphism. (See Section 2.4 for
further discussion.) The consequentialist utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if Co(d) = Co(s) (correct consequence)
0 if Co(d) 6= Co(s) (incorrect consequence). (2)
2.1.3 Private information and strategies
Each voter has a type, which represents private information or evidence about whether
p is true and information about whether q is true. A voter’s type takes the form of
an element of T := {pq, pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯}, generically denoted by t. For instance, the type
t = pq¯ represents evidence for p and for q¯, and the type t = p¯q¯ represents evidence for p¯
and for q¯, which is conflicting information since p¯q¯ 6∈ J . We write t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T n
for a profile of voters’ types.
Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) in J ×T n according to a probability
measure denoted Pr. When a proposition r in {p, p¯, q, q¯} represents (part of) voter
i’s type rather than (part of) the true state, we often write ri for r. For instance,
Pr(pi|p) is the probability that voter i has evidence for p given that p is true. By
convention, the prior probability of state s ∈ J is denoted
pis = Pr(s)
and is assumed to be in the interval (0, 1). The probability of getting evidence for r
given that r is true is denoted
ar = Pr(ri|r)
and by assumption belongs to (1/2, 1) and does not depend on the voter i.
By assumption, voters’ types are independent given the state. Moreover, given
the truth about p (i.e., either p or p¯), a voter’s evidence about p (i.e., either pi or p¯i)
is independent of the truth and the evidence about q; and similarly, given the truth
about q, a voter’s evidence about q is independent of the truth and the evidence
4This two-consequence situation corresponds to problems where the group action is represented
by a third proposition – conclusion proposition – which might be true or false. Judging it to be true
leads to one of the actions/consequences while judging it to be false leads to the other.
5There is still demand left for Firm C if only one of the companies is in the market.
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about p. These independence assumptions allow one to express the joint distribution
of the state and the types:
Pr(s, t) = Pr(s)×
n∏
i=1
Pr(ti|s).
Here, Pr(s) = pis, and the term Pr(ti|s) is also expressible in terms of our parameters;
for instance,
Pr(piqi|pq) = Pr(pi|pq) Pr(qi|pq, pi) = Pr(pi|p) Pr(qi|q) = apaq.
Pr(piq¯i|pq) = Pr(pi|pq) Pr(q¯i|pq, pi) = Pr(pi|p) Pr(q¯i|q) = ap(1− aq).
Each voter submits a vote in J based on his type. A (voting) strategy is a
function σ : T → J , mapping each type t ∈ T to the type’s vote v = σ(t). We write
σ = (σ1, ...., σn) for a profile of voters’ strategies. Together with a voting rule f and
a common utility function u, we now have a well-defined Bayesian game.
For a given type profile t ∈ T n, we call a decision d ∈ J efficient if it has maximal
expected utility conditional on the full information t. We adapt some common notions
of voting behaviour to this framework.
• A strategy σ of a voter is mostly informative if σ(t) = t for all t ∈ T \ {p¯q¯}.
• A strategy σ of a voter is informative if σ(t) = t for all t ∈ T \ {p¯q¯} and
σ(p¯q¯) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}.
• A strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is rational if each strategy is a best response
to the other strategies, i.e., if the profile is a Nash equilibrium of the corres-
ponding Bayesian game. Hence, each voter maximises the expected utility of
the collective decision given the strategies of the other voters.
• A strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) is efficient if for every type profile t =
(t1, ..., tn) the resulting decision d = f(σ1(t1), ..., σn(tn)) is efficient (i.e., has
maximal expected utility conditional on full information t). Hence, all the
information spread across the group is used efficiently: the collective decision is
no worse than a decision of a (virtual) social planner who has full information.
A voter with mostly informative strategy votes for her type if her type is non-
conflicting, i.e., not p¯q¯; while she completely ignores the conflicting evidence (t = p¯q¯).
In the case of informative strategy, conflicting evidence is followed partly. Unless we
particularly mean one of these strategies, we say informative behaviour to refer to
them. Note that rationality and efficiency refer to a whole profile of strategies.
We make two assumptions to avoid trivialities. First, we exclude the degenerate
case where some decision in J is not efficient for any type profile. Hence, each decision
is efficient for at least one type profile. Second, we exclude efficiency ties, i.e., those
special parameter combinations such that some type profile leads to different efficient
decisions (with different consequences when we assume consequentialist preferences).
Hence, we exclude those instances where a voter is indifferent between two decisions
except in the case that these decisions lead to the same consequence.
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2.2 A general (im)possibility
How should the voting rule be designed so that it leads to efficient decisions as well
as simple-minded, truthful voting behaviour in equilibrium? The objective of the
chapter is to answer this question. By simple-minded, truthful behaviour, we mean
informative behaviour. A voting rule encourages simple-minded behaviour if it makes
informative voting rational.6 If informative voting is both rational and efficient,
the objective is reached. Note that neither an informative strategy nor a mostly
informative strategy is unique. Informative voting being efficient means that for any
given type profile t, every profile of corresponding informative strategies is efficient.
By the following theorem, our objective is reduced to finding out when informative
voting is efficient.
Theorem 1 For any common utility function u : J 2 → R, and for any voting rule
f : J n → J , if a strategy profile is efficient, then it is rational.
This result applies to any kind of common preferences. Is it always possible to
find a voting rule which makes informative voting efficient, hence, rational? The next
theorem answers this question.
Theorem 2 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J 2 → R. There
exists no voting rule for which mostly informative voting is efficient.
This theorem states that there is no voting rule which achieves efficient inform-
ation aggregation for every possible mostly informative strategy profile. This result
comes as a surprise when one considers the single-issue setting and multi-issue setting
with no interconnections, where there is always a voting rule for which informative
voting is efficient. This contrast comes from the fact that the notion of informative
voting is not very clear in the current setting, since there is no straightforward way
of adapting informativeness. It is clear what a simple-minded voter should do when
she receives non-conflicting evidence about the state of the world, but what about
the conflicting evidence, p¯q¯? Here, voters with the mostly informative strategy have
no restriction upon receiving type p¯q¯. This leads to the question of whether the
impossibility persists when one considers informativeness differently. Let us now con-
sider informative voting. Voters holding informative strategy follow the conflicting
evidence partly. Does this additional requirement lead to any possibility for efficient
information aggregation? The result is yes, and it is formalized by the coming the-
orem. To state the theorem, we first introduce some notation and a condition.
Given a type profile t = (t1, ..., tn), let tpq = (tpq1, ..., tpqn) be the vector with
entities defined for i = 1, ..., n as tpqi = 1 if ti = pq and tpqi = 0 otherwise.
7 Given a
voting profile v, vpq is defined similarly. At this point, it is useful to remark that for
any type profile, there is an efficient decision.
6Here, by informative voting, we mean informative behaviour – with mostly informative strategy
or informative strategy – in general. This chapter analyses the case with informative strategy and
the case with mostly informative strategy separately.
7For instance, for the type profiles t = (pq¯, pq, p¯q¯) and t′ = (p¯q, pq, p¯q), tpq = t′pq = (0, 1, 0).
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Condition 1: For any t, t′ ∈ T n with tpq = t′pq, there is a decision d ∈ J which is
efficient for both t, t′.
Theorem 3 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J 2 → R. There
exists a voting rule for which informative voting is efficient if and only if Condition
1 holds.
When we require an informative voter to follow the conflicting evidence partly
instead of completely ignoring it, efficient information aggregation is possible when
some condition on the model parameters is satisfied. How does the voting rule making
efficient information aggregation possible look like? The answer depends on how
exactly the utility function is specified. We can say more about this rule only when
we focus on specific kind of preferences.
Having a general impossibility for informative voting with mostly informative
strategy, we focus on informative voting for the rest of the chapter. To see how
strong condition 1 is, one has to narrow focus on specific preferences. We study the
two natural kinds of preferences – simple and consequentialist preferences – in the
following subsections.
2.3 Simple preferences
We start by addressing simple preferences. Under simple preferences, correct decisions
are preferred to incorrect ones without further sophistication. By narrowing down
the focus on simple preferences, can we say more about the voting rule which makes
informative voting efficient under Condition 1 and obtain a more specific result than
the existential claim in Theorem 3? For simple preferences, we obtain the following
impossibility.
Theorem 4 Under simple preferences, there exists no voting rule for which inform-
ative voting is efficient.
It turns out that Condition 1 is never satisfied under simple preferences. In addi-
tion to the impossibility of efficient information aggregation with informative strategy
stated in Theorem 2, efficient information aggregation with informative strategy is
impossible under simple preferences. Does the impossibility persist under consequen-
tialist preferences? The next subsection addresses this question.
2.4 Consequentialist preferences
We now turn to consequentialist preferences. We consider situations where the de-
cision leads to one of two possible consequences. Such problems are very common
in practice and widely studied in the judgment aggregation literature, where the
two possible consequences are represented by conclusion propositions, c and c¯. The
decision leads to either acceptance of the conclusion proposition or rejection of it8.
8Consider the lead example of judgment aggregation: a jury is to decide whether the defendant
has broken the contract (p) or not (p¯) and whether the contract is legally valid (q) or not (q¯). The
defendant is convicted if and only if both propositions are collectively accepted. The consequence
function here is encoded by c↔ (p ∧ q).
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Consequence functions which lead all decisions to the same consequence are degen-
erate and uninteresting. If the consequence function depends only on the decision
between p and p¯, or only on the decision between q and q¯, then the decision problem
reduces to a problem with a single proposition-negation pair which has already been
studied in the literature. Therefore, there is only one interesting consequence function
up to isomorphism, and this function has the property Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q).
To state our result, we first define two coefficients:
A := pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1 ap¯
1− ap
B := pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1 aq¯
1− aq + pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
Theorem 5 Under consequentialist preferences, the following statements are equi-
valent:
(a) There exists a voting rule for which informative voting is efficient.
(b) A,B > pipq.
(c) pq is the efficient decision only for the type profile t = (pq, ..., pq).
Unlike under simple preferences, efficient information aggregation is possible un-
der consequentialist preferences, if pq is the efficient decision only when there is
overwhelming evidence for pq. This is satisfied when the prior probability of pq
is sufficiently low compared to prior probabilities of pq¯ and p¯q. For instance, if
pipq = pipq¯ = pip¯q = 0.7, ap = aq = ap¯ = aq¯ = 0.6 and n = 3, no voting rule makes
informative voting efficient, whereas if instead pipq = 0.6, such a voting rule exists.
Now comes the main question: how do such rules look like? Let us call the condition
stated at Theorem 5(b) Condition 2. We start by a simple characterization of voting
rules which make informative voting efficient.
Proposition 1 Assume consequentialist preferences and Condition 2. A voting rule
f makes informative voting efficient if and only if for every voting profile v ∈ J n,
the decision f(v) is pq if v = (pq, ..., pq) and in {pq¯, p¯q} otherwise.
While some of these voting rules making informative voting efficient are anonym-
ous, monotonic and neutral, some of them fail to satisfy any of these properties. The
number of votes for a proposition r in a voting profile v is written nvr . For n = 5,
two examples of anonymous and monotonic rules are given in the figure below:
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Figure 1: Two examples of voting rules given by Proposition 1 for n = 5
Figure 1(b) shows a neutral voting rule in addition to being anonymous and
monotonic. This voting rule belongs to a class of voting rules defined by the following
conditions. For each v ∈ J n,
f(v) = pq ⇐⇒ nvp = nvq = n (3)
f(v) = pq¯ if nvp > n
v
q (4)
f(v) = p¯q if nvp < n
v
q (5)
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} if nvp = nvq < n (6)
By this class of voting rules defined by (3-6), we characterize the class of anonym-
ous, monotonic and neutral voting rules making informative voting efficient under
Condition 2.
Theorem 6 Assume consequentialist preferences and Condition 2. A voting rule f
makes informative voting efficient and is anonymous, monotonic and neutral if and
only if f is defined by (3)-(6).
Besides satisfying nice properties, these rules are reasonably practical and nat-
ural. We have now shown the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
a mechanism for efficient information aggregation, and characterized the mechanism
with natural properties. Among the aggregation possibilities, anonymity, monoton-
icity and neutrality can be attained if required. What about independence? The next
section answers this question.
3 Consistency and quota rules under consequentialist
preferences
Quota rules are very natural and common among various voting rules. Under quota
rules, separate votes are taken on each proposition using acceptance thresholds. In
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the previous section, we have seen that under consequentialist preferences, efficient in-
formation aggregation is possible in an anonymous, monotonic and neutral way when
some condition on the model parameters is satisfied. Quota rules are monotonic,
anonymous and independent, but not necessarily neutral.9 This section examines the
possibility of efficient information aggregation with quota rules under consequential-
ist preferences. To do so, one has to re-define a voting rule and utility function.
The model described in the previous section applies to this section with exceptions
described below.
Let J ∗ := {pq, pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯}. For this section, a voting rule is a function f : J n →
J ∗, mapping each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision d ≡ f(v). A voting rule
f is called ‘consistent’ if it never returns p¯q¯.
The consequentialist utility function is now given as u : J ∗×J → R, mapping any
decision-state pair (d, s) ∈ J ∗ × J to its utility u(d, s). By assumption, the decision
p¯q¯ never has the correct consequence, hence, Co(p¯q¯) 6= Co(s). The consequentialist
utility function is given by (2).
A quota rule is given by two thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, and for each voting
profile it accepts p [q] if and only if at least mp [mq] voters accept it in the profile.
Quota rules are characterized by anonymity, monotonicity and independence. The
remark below follows from Theorem 2(c) in Dietrich and List (2007) and gives the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a quota rule to be consistent under the given
agenda.
Remark 1 A quota rule is consistent if and only if mp +mq ≤ n+ 1.
The proof of this remark follows from the fact that there can be at most n votes in
total for p¯ and q¯ (since p¯q¯ /∈ J ). It is easy to see that consistency is attained whenever
mp +mq ≤ n. Moreover, if mp +mq = n+ 1, the number of p votes or the number of
q votes exceeds the acceptance threshold, so, the resulting decision is never p¯q¯. Note
that if a voting rule leads to efficient decisions, then it is consistent. So, as long as
efficiency is guaranteed, consistency follows. Among all the rules making informative
voting efficient, is there a quota rule? The theorem below answers this question.
Theorem 7 Under consequentialist preferences, there exists no quota rule making
informative voting efficient.
A consistent quota rule is always available by Remark 1 regardless of the model
parameters or the utility function chosen. However, there is no possibility for efficient
information aggregation using quota rules.
4 Conclusion
We consider a model where a group of voters with common interests wants to form
collective judgments over two propositions which are mutually interconnected. Each
of these propositions is factually true or false, but the truth value is unknown to
voters. Each voter has a type representing evidence about what the true state might
9Whenever the acceptance thresholds for propositions are equal, they turn out to be neutral.
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be and this is private information. We study the problem of efficient information
aggregation when propositions are mutually interconnected. The results depend par-
ticularly on how the utility function is specified. It turns out that a voting rule which
makes informative voting efficient does not exist under simple preferences while such
a rule exists under consequentialist preferences if some condition relating the model
parameters and the utility function is satisfied. We want to design a voting rule
which make every possible informative strategy profile efficient. Under simple pref-
erences, it is of course possible to find a voting rule which makes some informative
strategy profile efficient. However, we believe a voting rule which sometimes makes
informative voting efficient is not really interesting.
We leave unanswered whether these results persist when conflicting private in-
formation – p¯q¯ in this case – is not allowed. In that case, we can no longer assume
that a voter’s evidence about one proposition is independent of the evidence about
the other proposition conditional on the truth. For instance, if a voter has p¯ in her
type, she must have q. Informative strategy is then defined as direct revelation of
types, and there is a unique informative strategy profile given a type profile.
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A Appendix: proofs
We begin by some preliminary derivations and then prove the results
A.1 Preliminary derivations
The joint probability of a state-types vector (s, t) = (spsq, t1pt1q, ..., tnptnq) ∈ J n+1
is
Pr(s, t) = Pr(s) Pr(t|s) = Pr(s)
∏
i
Pr(ti|s) = Pr(sp) Pr(sq)
∏
i
Pr(tip|sp) Pr(tiq|sq),
where the last two equations follow from independence assumptions.
The probability of the three states in J conditional on the full information t ∈J n
is given as follows, where k := ntp and l := n
t
q:
Pr(pq|t) = pipqa
k
p(1− ap)n−kalq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
(7)
Pr(pq¯|t) = pipq¯a
k
p(1− ap)n−k(1− aq¯)lan−lq¯
Pr(t)
(8)
Pr(p¯q|t) = pip¯q(1− ap¯)
kan−kp¯ alq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
. (9)
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A.2 Proofs.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider any voting rule f : J n → J and any efficient
strategy profile σ. Consider any voter i and type ti ∈ T . To show that σ is rational,
one has to show that i’s vote σi(ti) maximizes her expected utility conditional on ti.
This follows from the fact that voters share common preferences. Since the resulting
decision is efficient, it maximizes the expected utility of each voter. Thus, σ is
rational. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . Suppose for a contra-
diction f makes informative voting efficient. Consider the type profile t = (p¯q¯, ..., p¯q¯),
where all voters have the type p¯q¯. Then, the set of all voting profiles which may result
from informative voting is J n. Since informative voting is efficient, for each v ∈ J n,
f(v) is efficient given t. Then, it follows that for all type profiles in T n, f(v) is
efficient. This either means that some decision in J is not efficient for any type pro-
file which contradicts to non-degeneracy assumption, or all decisions in J are always
efficient for any type profile which contradicts to no efficiency ties assumption.10 
Proof of Theorem 3. To start with, we introduce some notation. Given a voting
profile v, let Θ(v) denote the set of all type profiles which possibly lead to v under
informative voting. Given a type profile t, let Ω(t) denote the set of all voting
profiles which possibly result from t under informative voting. Consider a voting rule
f : J n → J .
First, let Condition 1 hold. Suppose there is an exogenously given ordering of
judgment sets, and let f be the following voting rule: for all v ∈ J n, f(v) = d ⇐⇒
d is the highest ordered decision among all decisions which are efficient for some
t ∈ Θ(v). Consider any type profile tˆ ∈ T n and suppose informative voting. We
want to show that (*) for each v ∈ Ω(ˆt), f(v) is efficient for tˆ. Let v ∈ Ω(ˆt). One
can show that all type profiles in Θ(v) share the same subvector restricted to pq.
Since Condition 1 holds, there is some decision d which is efficient for all t ∈ Θ(v),
including tˆ. It follows from Condition 1 that if any other decision d′ 6= d is efficient
for some t ∈ Θ(v), it is efficient for all t ∈ Θ(v). Then, (*) holds.
Conversely, let f make informative voting efficient. Let t, t′ be two type profiles
in T n with tpq = t′pq. One has to show that (*) there is d ∈ J which is efficient
for both t, t′. By construction, for each v ∈ Ω(t), t′ ∈ Θ(v); and similarly, for each
v′ ∈ Ω(t′), t ∈ Θ(v′). Then, f(v) must be efficient for t′ (as well as t) and f(v′) must
be efficient for t (as well as t′) since informative voting is efficient. So, (*) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that Condition 1 never
holds under simple preferences. Suppose for a contradiction, it holds. Consider the
two type profiles t = (pq¯, ..., pq¯) and t′ = (p¯q, ..., p¯q). Since tpq = t′pq and Condition
1 holds, there is a decision which is efficient for both profiles. By non-degeneracy
10For the case where the consequence function is defined in such a way that all three judgment
sets in J lead to the same consequence, the second assumption is not violated. In such situations,
there is no decision making problem since all decisions are equally good for each voter. Such utility
functions are excluded.
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assumption, pq¯ must be efficient for t since otherwise pq¯ wouldn’t be efficient for any
type profile which contradicts to non-degeneracy assumption. Similarly, p¯q must be
efficient for t′. Hence, pq¯ and p¯q are both efficient given t or t′, which contradicts to
no-efficiency ties assumption. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let the statement in (b) be called Condition 2.
(1) We first prove that (c) implies (a) and (b). Assume Condition 2 holds. This
implies that Condition 1 holds. By Theorem 3, there is a voting rule which makes
informative voting efficient. Let t, t′ be type profiles with one pq¯ and one p¯q re-
spectively while each of the rest of the types is pq. Without loss of generality, let
t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯). By Condition 2, pq¯, p¯q are both efficient for each
of the type profiles. Using (7) and (9), we can write the following:
E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) (10)
⇔pipq¯an−1p (1− ap)(1− aq¯)n + pip¯q(1− ap¯)n−1ap¯anq > pipqan−1p (1− ap)anq (11)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1( ap¯
1− ap
)
> pipq. (12)
Similarly,
E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′) (13)
⇔pipq¯anp (1− aq¯)n−1aq¯ + pip¯q(1− ap¯)nan−1q (1− aq) > pipqanpan−1q (1− aq) (14)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1( aq¯
1− aq
)
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
> pipq. (15)
So, A,B > pipq.
(2) We now prove that (a) implies (c). Consider a voting rule f : J n → J and
suppose f makes informative voting efficient. By Theorem 3, Condition 1 holds.
Given a type profile t ∈ T n, let Γ(t) denote the set of type profiles which have the
same subvector on pq as in t. Recall that the number of occurrences for a proposition
r in a type profile t is written ntr. Now, take a type profile tˆ ∈ T n with k times pq
where 1 ≤ k < n. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Claim 1: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(tˆ) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
Any type profile with k times pq and n − k times p¯q¯ satisfies this condition and
one of these type profiles is obviously in Γ(tˆ). Now, take t˜ ∈ T n with k− 1 times pq.
Claim 2: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(t˜) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
One can easily see there is always a type profile with the exact same pq structure
as t˜ and with only one occurrence of pq¯ and only one occurrence of p¯q.
Claim 3: Under consequentialist preferences, for all t, t′ ∈ T n with ntp = nt
′
p and
ntq = n
t′
q , E(u(d, S)|t) = E(u(d, S)|t′) for each d ∈ J .
The claim follows from the expressions (7)-(9). By Condition 1, there is a decision
d ∈ J which is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ). Similarly, there is a decision d ∈ J which
is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Combining Claim 1, 2 and 3, one obtains that the same
decision d ∈ J is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ) and all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Since this is true for all k
with 1 ≤ k < n, there is a decision d which is efficient for all t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
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By non-degeneracy assumption, pq is efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). Hence, this decision
must be in {pq¯, p¯q} since otherwise pq would be efficient for all type profiles which
contradicts to non-degeneracy assumption. Since E(u(pq¯, S)|t) = E(u(p¯q, S)|t) for
all t, both pq¯ and p¯q are efficient for all t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}. Hence, Condition 2
holds.
(3) We finally prove that (b) implies (c). Let A,B > pipq. To show that Condition
2 holds, we first show the following claim.
Claim 4: The expected utility of pq given a type profile t is an increasing function
of ntp and n
t
q.
The claim follows from the definition of the utility function and from Pr(S = pq|t)
being an increasing function of ntp and n
t
q. Let t, t
′ ∈ T n be type profiles with one pq¯
and one p¯q respectively while each of the rest of the types is pq. Without loss of gener-
ality, let t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯). By (7) and (9), one has E(u(pq¯, S)|t) >
E(u(pq, S)|t) and E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′). By the claim, it follows that
E(u(pq¯, S)|t) = E(u(p¯q, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) for all t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)} which
means pq¯, p¯q are efficient for each t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}. Thus, Condition 2 holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . Proof if the ‘if’ part
is obvious and left to the reader. To show converse, let f make informative voting
efficient. Since Condition 2 holds, for all voting profiles obtained by informative voting
from any t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}, f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. By non-degeneracy assumption, pq
is efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). By f making informative voting efficient, f(v) = pq if
v = (pq, ..., pq). 
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . First, assume f
is defined by (3)-(6). Clearly, f is anonymous. It follows from Proposition 1 that
informative voting is efficient with f since for all v ∈ J n, f(v) = pq if and only if
nvp = n
v
q = n; so, if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq). To show monotonicity of f , take two
voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such that for all r ∈ f(v), the voters who vote for r in v
also vote for r in v′.
Case 1: f(v) = pq. Then v = (pq, ..., pq). By definition, v′ = v and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. The definition of f implies either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n;
and the definition of v′ implies nv′p ≥ nvp and nv
′
q ≤ nvq . Suppose the former is true.
Then, nv
′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯. Next, suppose nvp = nvq < n. If v′ 6= v, one has
nv
′
p > n
v
p or n
v′
q < n
v
q which means n
v′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯. It is obvious that if
v′ = v, we are done.
Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
It remains to show neutrality of f . Take two voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such
that vr = v
′
r′ for every distinct r, r
′ ∈ {p, q} and there is no permutation of voters
(i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). We have to show that (*) f accepts r in v
if and only if f accepts r′ in v′. We distinguish 3 cases:
Case 1: f(v) = pq. It is clear that v′ = v, and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. By definition of f , either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n. One can
see that the latter is not possible since then one could find a permutation of voters
(i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). Suppose the former is true. By definition
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of v′, whenever p (q) is accepted in v, q (p) is accepted in v′. This means nv′p < nv
′
q
and f(v′) = p¯q. So, f accepts p in v and q in v′, and it accepts q¯ in v and p¯ in v′.
Hence, (*) holds.
Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
Conversely, let f be anonymous, monotonic and neutral, and make informative
voting efficient. We have to show that (*) f is defined by (3)-(6). By Proposition
1 and informative voting being efficient, f(v) = pq if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq),
equivalently nvp = n
v
q = n. Now, take a voting profile v ∈ J n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
Case 1: nvp > n
v
q . Suppose for a contradiction, f(v) = p¯q. Let v
′ be a voting
profile with nv
′
p = n
v
q and n
v′
q = n
v
p . We start by proving the following claim.
Claim: For each combination of k, l ∈ {0, ..., n}, there is only one voting profile
v ∈ J n with nvp = k and nvp = l up to the permutations of votes.
The claim follows from the fact that all votes containing p¯ are p¯q, and similarly, all
votes containing q¯ are pq¯. Hence, subtracting number of p (q) occurrences in a profile
from n gives the exact number of p¯q (pq¯) votes. Then, there is only one voting profile
with nvp times q and n
v
q times p up to permutations of votes by the claim. Hence, by
neutrality and anonymity, f(v′) = pq¯. However, by monotonicity of f , f(v′) = p¯q
since nv
′
p ≤ nvp and nv
′
q ≥ nvq , a contradiction. Then, f(v) = pq¯ if nvp > nvq .
Case 2: nvp < n
v
q . One can show that f(v) = p¯q analogously to Case 1.
Case 3: nvp = n
v
q < n. By Proposition 1 and informative voting being efficient,
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}.
So, (*) is true. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider a quota rule f : J n → J ∗ with thresholds mp and
mq. Suppose for a contradiction, f makes informative voting efficient. By Theorem 5,
this means Condition 2 holds. Moreover, f(v) = pq if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq) by
Condition 2 and informative voting being efficient. So, mp = mq = n. Now, consider
any voting profile v which has the following property: if n is even, there are n2 times
pq¯ and n2 times p¯q in v, and if n is odd, there are
n−1
2 times pq¯ and
n+1
2 times p¯q
in v. It follows that f(v) = p¯q¯ since n ≥ 2, which is not efficient for any given type
profile. Hence, a contradiction. 
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